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It Wasn't Me: Reply to Karin Meyers
Rick Repetti 1

Abstract
This is my reply to Karin Meyers, "False Friends: Dependent Origination and the Perils of Analogy in Cross-Cultural
Philosophy," in this Symposium. Meyers generally focuses
on exegesis of what Early Buddhists said, which reasonably constrains what we may think about them if we are
Buddhists. I agree with and find much value in most of her
astute analyses, here and elsewhere, so I restrict my reply
here to where we disagree, or otherwise seem to be speaking past, or misunderstanding, each other. In this regard, I
focus on three of her claims. Meyers argues that (1) Buddhist dependent origination is not determinism; (2) attempts at naturalizing Buddhism threaten to run afoul of
her hermeneutics; and (3) I seem to err on both fronts.
However, I have emphasized that I am not a determinist,
and I am not as concerned with what Buddhists did say
about causation and agency. As a philosopher, I am mainly
concerned with what philosophers can say about them.
1 Philosophy Department, Kingsborough Community College, City University of New
York. Email: rick.repetti@kbcc.cuny.edu.
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Thus, Meyers's criticisms of my work seem predicated on
interpretations of ideas I do not exactly espouse. Thus, the
"Repetti" that Meyers primarily critiqued, as the title to
this Reply (hopefully humorously) makes clear, wasn't me!
Whether I have failed to make my ideas clear, she has
failed to accurately interpret them, or some combination
of both, I am uncertain. Thus, I focus on trying to clarify
those ideas of mine that Meyers seems to interpret in a
way that I do not intend.

Introduction
I have the utmost respect for the positive, constructive work that Karin

Meyers has contributed to this discussion, here and in the edited collection, as well as to her excellent exegetical work elsewhere, interpreting
Vasubandhu, and so forth. However, I am puzzled by some of her criticisms here, some of which seem to run afoul of the principle of charitable interpretation. The "Repetti" she critiques arguably wasn't me, but an
interpretation that I would question. (Hence, the title of this paper.)
I was once guilty of similarly questionable interpretation when

critiquing the work of Mark Siderits, in this journal (Repetti Reductionism). Siderits kindly informed me that what Siderits says and Siderits's view
are two different things, that the Paleo-compatibilist position that he
adduced was simply "a" position he thought certain Buddhist reductionists could take, and thus a position he was taken to delineating, but not
one he was advocating as his own, nor as correct. I think a similar distinction is applicable here, our other (minor) disagreements notwithstanding.
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Meyers's Claims and My Replies
First, we have a point of disagreement, but one that also suggests Meyers
is not representing my views adequately. In her opening sentence, Meyers assumes that there was no free will concept or discussion in Buddhism until recently, stating "neither the idea nor problem of free will
were part of Buddhist intellectual history prior to contact with western
philosophy in the modern era" (787). A few paragraphs later, she also
claims: "Repetti ... and most of the other contributors ... seem to agree
that ... Buddhists did not have the idea of free will, much less a problem
with it historically" (789).
However, in the edited collection she refers to, I argued against
that view, noting that: (1) despite the fact that the term "free will" is absent in pre-modern Buddhist history, enough elements of the concept
occur (Repetti Why); (2) the Buddha rejected a number of inevitabilist
views that cover the range of free will skepticism, committing him to
acceptance of some cognate of free will, regardless of the absence of that
exact term (Repetti Agentless); and (3) the attempt to reconcile karmic
causation with the sort of voluntary behavior required for the Buddhist
path comes close enough to aspects of the free will problem to be considered a Buddhist parallel (Repetti Introduction). In addition, I noted (Introduction) that: (4) two of the contributors, Mark Siderits and Charles
Goodman, debate the extent to which the free will problem is reflected
in the tension generated by the facially contradictory advice of the authoritative Buddhist philosopher-sage, Santideva, which is to view others' negative behavior impersonally, but to view our own behavior personally; and that (5) another contributor, Emily McRae, discusses a congruent tension discernible in the similar advice of another Buddhist philosopher-sage, Tsongkhapa. I devoted considerable attention to the nuances on both sides of such views, so Meyers's remarks above seem to
ignore those of my claims in Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (to which
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anthology she also contributed) that are relevant to the accuracy of her
comments.
Second, Meyers seems to critique an interpretation of my view
that I would deny, and on grounds I also question. In footnote 11, Meyers
objects to my therapeutic sort of suggestion (Repetti Why) that a Buddhist theory of free will could play a role for Western, secular Buddhists
who might by conditioned by a just-world assumption (an unconscious
holdover from now-defunct belief in a creator God). I suggested that
Buddhist beliefs in karma and rebirth may play what I dubbed a "soteriodical" (soteriological, theodicy-like) role, eventually to be transcended
by becoming more deeply steeped in the no-self view, at which point
non-belief in post-mortem survival no longer matters. Meyers argues
that my suggestion is "dubious on both exegetical and pragmatic
grounds" (fn. 11), the exegetical idea (presumably) being that most (nonWestern) Buddhists do not conceive of karma and rebirth that way, and
the pragmatic idea being that most Western Buddhists find the idea of
rebirth more difficult to assimilate than the idea of the no-self. This line
of criticism is part of a larger theme that runs throughout Meyers's contribution here, to the effect that Western philosophers who opt for a
naturalized Buddhism may be unwittingly departing from Buddhism in
some (unspecified but) important sense.
I think Meyers's analysis partly misses the mark here in at least
two ways. First, this comment ("dubious on both exegetical and pragmatic grounds") seems to confuse most Western philosophers with most
Westerners, but these are radically different animals. Whereas it is not
unreasonable to think most of our contemporary Western academic colleagues
(philosophers, scholars, intellectuals, etc.) are probably naturalists who
are less comfortable with the idea of rebirth than they are with the idea
that the self is some sort of construct, the average Western person is much
more deeply committed to the substantive metaphysical nature of an
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enduring self than they are to a denial of post-mortem survival. Second,
Meyers interprets my therapeutic suggestion as an exegetical one, but it
is not: It is a purely pragmatic justification for a possible soteriodical
and/ or therapeutic role for a theory of free will that might carry the average Western person (not necessarily philosophers or scholars) some
distance along the Buddhist path as they come to shift perspectives
about the just-world assumption and the nature of the self. The idea,
simply, is that many average Westerners have emerged from, but are
probably still attached to, a just-world view that is no longer supported
by monotheistic belief. There is enough in Buddhist doxology, such as
the doctrines of karma and rebirth, that can serve as a temporary substitute for the underlyingjust-world assumption for those so inclined. This
substitute can feed those soteriodical needs while they slowly mature in
the Buddhist path and gradually become comfortable with the no-self
idea as they transform through contemplative experience. This was also
but one (minor) among several (major) arguments I gave in support of
the idea that there is, can be, and ought to be a Buddhist theory of free
will.
Curiously, later on Meyers endorses what she critically attributes
to me as my strategy, although with her own twist-a twist which, on my
analysis (see below), is not really different in one sense, but is very different in another. Meyers states:
Instead of taking karma and rebirth as skillful means that
might be replaced by a more naturalistic Buddhism, I suggest a soteriodicy in which Buddhist naturalism serves as
a skillful means to lure western seekers and Bu-curious
philosophers to take up a seemingly naturalistic practice
of Buddhist meditation, and then decide if their naturalism remains satisfying or plausible. (812)
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My skillful-means-type suggestion, again, was just that Westerners tacitly possessed of a just-world assumption might be attracted to
Buddhism because its twin doctrines of karma and rebirth could fulfill a
theodicy-like function (soteriodicy: a godless analogue of theodicy that is
soteriologically equivalent). This attraction could conceivably motivate,
and promise some just-world-type comfort in, the soteriodical doctrines
of karma and rebirth. (This would be regardless of whether they do so
consciously or unconsciously, with more or less faith in a just-world theory, or whether or not they do so in a supernatural, quasi-supernatural,
or pseudo-natural sense, according as they are individually inclined.)
Over time, as they gradually become comfortable with the idea of the noself, the no-self view could render the just-world view otiose. In my
analogy, I compared monotheistic just-world-theory-based theodicy
with heroin, and karma/rebirth soteriodicy with methadone, for recovering theists, most of which are ordinary people drawn to meditation
and Buddhism, not professional philosophers or scholars. I did not suggest presenting Buddhism as seemingly naturalistic to naturalistic Western philosophers or scholars in order to lure them into Buddhist meditation practices that might engender supernatural experiences that would
then implicitly challenge their naturalism. Flanagan, another contributor to the collection (Negative) that Meyers criticizes, does not do that
either: he simply suggests that Buddhism can be naturalized, for philosophers so inclined (Bodhisattva), and that Buddhism can do without a free
will theory (Negative).
Meyers, however, explicitly suggests presenting Buddhism as a
seemingly naturalistic (but implicitly a stealth supernatural) philosophy in
order to lure Western philosophers and scholars into meditation practices, implicitly with the idea that their contemplative experiences
might not be able to be assimilated within their physicalism and naturalism. This line of reasoning suggests the sort of supernaturalism that she
seems to imply might be necessary for (a more genuinely Buddhist) Bud-
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dhism. However, in suggesting that the supernatural elements are optional for Western Buddhists, I am merely pointing out that these ideas
are, in fact, optional for those who might prefer to see them as such. By
analogy, it is optional for thus-inclined contemporary Catholics whether
to believe that the Eucharist is literally the flesh-substance of Jesus, or for
Jews whether to believe that pork is unclean; it is a separate question
whether those who reject such beliefs remain true Catholics or Jews, respectively, but that is not my concern. The supernatural beliefs Meyers
seems to think are not optional for those who wish to remain Buddhists
clearly are not what Descartes had in mind (in his Third Meditation)
when he argued that we cannot help but believe propositions that are
clearly and distinctly true. To the contrary, the supernatural beliefs
Meyers has in mind are the sort of ideas about which Descartes would
have thought we ought to withhold judgment: propositions that are neither clearly and distinctly true, nor clearly and distinctly false, but in the
grey area in between, what William James called "live options."
To the extent that each of us is responsible for our judgments regarding propositions that are neither clearly and distinctly true nor
clearly and distinctly false (propositions about which Descartes thought
we should withhold judgment), assenting to their veracity is clearly optional as a matter of epistemology and as a matter of freedom of thought.
Pragmatists like James would argue that for some of these sorts of propositions, pragmatic considerations require us to decide consciously
whether to assent to them or not, namely, if they are necessary (meaning,
if not deciding consciously implicitly entails a position on them) or momentous (meaning, of great consequence). If we-Buddhists or otherwise-are not free to form our own judgments about things that are neither clearly and distinctly true nor clearly and distinctly false, then we
are not free to form any judgments. For none of us is free to form our
own judgments about things that are clearly and distinctly true (because
we must believe those) or things that are clearly and distinctly false (be-
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cause we cannot believe those), as Descartes insightfully observed. Any
ideology that demands that adherents cannot decide whether to lend
assent to uncertain propositions is therefore multiply suspect.
Insisting that certain metaphysical beliefs are not optional for
members of a religious belief system might seem innocuous when it
comes to the study of the doctrinal beliefs of followers of Early Buddhism, say, but maintaining this sort of stance beyond those parameters
would threaten to invalidate all but the earliest form of Buddhism, in
which case I'm not sure the works of V asubandhu, Candrakirti, Nagarjuna, or Santideva, for example, would be valid objects of genuine Buddhist
study. That sort of thinking could also demand that true Catholics must
believe in the transubstantiation of a piece of unleavened bread into the
flesh of the deceased and resurrected body ofJesus, and that they engage
in the ritual deivorous, cannibalistic act, once a week, of consuming that
metaphysical substance in the Sacrament of Holy Communion. Considerations such as these function as a reductio ad absurdum for the idea that
otherwise ungrounded (supernatural) beliefs in what science currently
considers fantasy are not optional for contemporary secular Western
Buddhists.
I acknowledge that a form of Buddhism that jettisons these supernatural ideas may or may not be properly considered "traditional"
Buddhism, depending on how we wish to define that term. I accept Buddhists insisting that if these ideas are removed, the result is no longer
traditional Buddhism, strictly speaking, but some derivative. But I have
no objection to derivative forms of Buddhism, given its long and everadaptive history. I have taken no position, nor argued for one, on the
normative aspect of this issue, i.e., whether these ideas should be jettisoned, or, if they are, whether or not the resulting view is sufficiently
Buddhist. In fact, later on, Meyers herself says (of me) that I am "quite
aware of the fact that most Buddhists would not recognize a naturalized
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Buddhism as Buddhist" (797, emphasis hers), so this line of reasoning, on
her part, seems unnecessary, if it is thought to be directed at my views.
In fairness to Meyers, many of her objections do not name me explicitly
as their target, so it is possible they are not directed at me. In fairness to
myself, however, Meyers does weave in and out of many objections, explicitly mentioning and quoting me, interspersed with these more general objections, which gives the impression that most of them do target
me, unless otherwise specified. In such cases, it is somewhat unclear. If
any of these objections were not meant to be directed at my views, then
my replies to those objections can be set aside, or at least the parts of
those replies that assume that the objections are directed at my views.
Meyers generally acknowledges the legitimacy of the sort of
analysis of Buddhist thinking about free will that I employ, but seems to
be worried that it might be being offered instead of an analysis that is
more exegetical, stating:
I would only urge that this be alongside and not in the
stead of traditional Buddhist perspectives, and that we
avoid any a priori assumption that modern naturalism has
a greater claim on the possible or true than traditional
forms of Buddhism. (I'm not sure Repetti would disagree.)
(793)

I would not disagree. I do not advocate the naturalism she worries will
replace supernatural Buddhism, and I have no reason to reject the sort of
exegetical analysis that would delve into the core doctrinal philosophy
of traditional Buddhism, about which I am admittedly relatively agnostic. I have made many remarks about how, as an analytic philosopher
(and a long-term contemplative practitioner) I focus on what Buddhists
can say, as opposed to what they have said or do say. I presented my
views, not instead of, but "alongside" her own "traditional Buddhist perspective," and over a dozen other views of Buddhist philosophers and

866

Repetti, It Wasn't Me

scholars, some traditional, others not, in the aptly-named Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (note the plural term in the title), to which Meyers
contributed. My remarks introducing these diverse views (Preface; Introduction) explicitly frame them as having been sequenced in a way to
form a dialectical progression, with each subsequent article engaging in
some way with the ones adjacent to it, forming a sort of philosophical
conversation, a number of which contributions were of the sort Meyers
seems to prefer, including her own contribution to that conversation.
Again, in my own contributions to the anthology, I have made clear that
a driving insight behind my motivation to explore possible Buddhist
theories of free will is the fact that meditation virtuosos possess titanic,
supernormal, and possibly supernatural abilities that make the mundane
conception of free will set forth by the libertarian (as the strongest version of free will on offer in Western philosophy, namely, the ability to
have done otherwise under identical conditions) pale in comparison.
Thus, I agree that contemporary naturalist assumptions ought
not to be afforded such a superior a priori status that they automatically
displace or replace traditional conceptions, and I doubt that I have given
the impression that they should. Thus, I'm not sure what motivates remarks such as this last one, where Meyers urges against something I do
not advocate. Although I did not press this point in the anthology, I do
think that while there is no a priori argument against treating claims
from pre-scientific eras as dismissible on that ground alone, or on the
related grounds of their supernatural or magical content, there are a posteriori arguments for favoring a scientific approach over a magical or
pre-scientific one.
Consider, for example, contemporary contemplative neuroscience versus ancient contemplative claims, as reflected in a criticism of
contemplative neuroscience that might be made by Buddhist practitioners to the effect that studying the brains of meditation practitioners
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cannot increase our understanding of the mind in ways that meditation
itself can, or that we cannot infer anything about the mind from analyses of the brains of meditation practitioners, contrary to the phenomenal findings of contemplative neuroscience. There's validity in the general critique of contemplative neuroscience as involving some potentially misleading hyperbole (Van Dam et al.), but also validity in the provocative findings of contemplative neuroscience, such as the claim that
meditation virtuosos like Mingyur Rinpoche exhibit otherwise extremely
rare, momentary gamma waves as an enduring baseline state, and several multiples of gamma waves when practicing meditation (Goleman and
Davidson 216-228). I would not favor the anecdotal mystical claims of
someone from a pre-scientific age over those of neuroscience, as if the
latter is less well founded than the former, or on equal footing. What evidence is there for the former? If, as Meyers seems to think, these claims
ought to be presented alongside each other, presumably as equally credible alternatives, then I would disagree. By analogy, evolution theory and
intelligent design theory are not equally credible: not a priori, but precisely because a posteriori evidence massively confirms evolution theory,
and there is little to confirm intelligent design theory, absent some sort
of underlying metaphysical orientation.
As skeptical philosopher Robert Nozick once said (158-159 ), absent supramundane background beliefs, what reason is there to believe
the nondual mystical experience is more than just an unusual state in
which the cognitive apparatus is damped down (like a stereo system that
is on but is not playing anything)? It seems to be a case of special pleading (double standard) to hold such a high level of skeptical scrutiny for
neuroscience, yet almost no scrutiny for one's own supramundane belief
system, one shrouded, no less, in esoterica about emptiness, antirealism, yogic perception, alternate dimensions that map onto trance
states, etc. Although I tend to think there is something to the supramundane experience more than Nozick suggests, based on my own mystical
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experience, when claims based on mystical experiences compete with
claims based in science, principles of parsimony and the like do generally favor claims based in science. To think otherwise, as I more recently
argued (Buddhism), begs the question in the sense that the grounds of
such claims are in greater need of support than the claims themselves.
Sometimes Meyers's comments seem to move in two directions at
the same time. For example, she says, "I don't think he means it" (to
which preface I would question why she suggests something she does
not think I mean), adding,
but because the analogy between the impersonal view of
science and the Buddhist view of no-self does a fair bit of
work in his soteriological justification for a Buddhist theory of free will, Repetti comes dangerously close at times to
equating a modern scientific worldview with the ultimate
truth of Buddhism. (794)
I do compare them, but not as part of my soteriological justification of

the theory of free will that I develop, but only for the sake of trying to do
two things: (1) to help the reader understand the (otherwise incredibly
impenetrable, if not convoluted) Buddhist two truths doctrine by reference to the analogous set of binary perspectives found in the scientific
versus common sense (naive realist) views of the world; and (2) to put
Buddhism in the respectable light of science. I clearly do not equate
them, however. I also see nothing "dangerous" in relating them.
Meyers (794) goes a step further, stating (of me) that "he adds the
distinctively modern and western dichotomy between religion and science into the mix," referencing my claim that "A Buddhist NOMA issue is
arguably whether conventional Buddhist truth (e.g., Buddhist religion) is
non-overlapping with ultimate Buddhist truth (akin to science)," as if
being distinctively modern, western, or dichotomous might make "the
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mix" (of my ideas) problematic, but without saying exactly what the
problem is. (I will explain what a NOMA issue is shortly.) In response, I
would call attention to certain words in my quoted sentence: "issue,"
"arguably," and "whether". It is "arguably" a legitimate philosophical
point of curiosity or interest, i.e., an "issue," particularly a NOMA issue,
"whether" Buddhist conventional truths (which are arguably religious)
and Buddhist ultimate truths (which are arguably not religious, but more
analogous to what science considers ultimately real or true) are compatible or incompatible, or overlapping or non-overlapping, analogous to
the NOMA issue.
What is a NOMA issue? According to Gould, science and religion
range over "non-overlapping magisteria" (NOMA). This idea may be
viewed as an issue of whether and to what extent religious beliefs, which
may be understood to be part of the non-scientific world view, are distinct from scientific ones, in such a way that they have their own criteria, not necessarily the same sort of truth conditions that govern factual
or scientific statements. Attempting to form a truce between them,
Gould thought religion and science involve non-overlapping magisteria,
with religion ranging over values and science ranging over facts. I think
Gould is clearly wrong about that, as do most philosophers of religion
and philosophers of science (as may be seen by considering whether intelligent design theory competes with evolution theory), but the idea is
interestingly promising with respect to some interpretations of Buddhism. I did not assert that Buddhism (per se, or parsed into conventional and ultimate terms) does, nor that it does not, fall into one or the other of the two categories, NOMA or non-NOMA (overlapping). Instead,
again, I was simply mapping out interesting logical possibilities that
might raise the level of philosophical discussion about the issue of Buddhism and free will.

870

Repetti, It Wasn't Me

In general, almost everything I have said about Buddhism and
free will is in the category of logical possibilities intended to raise the
philosophical level of the discussion, as opposed to advocating views of
my own-not that I never do that: sometimes I do advocate this or that
point. But most of my points are made arguendo. Meyers goes on to admit
(793) that she herself has made the sorts of comparisons I have made,
and to suggest that her critique is driven by the need to differentiate between these ideas and comparisons-as if making such comparisons others give the impression that these things are more alike than they are, as
her title, "False Friends," suggests, but as if by delineating "the Perils of
Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," as her subtitle has it, she is not.
Admittedly, these impressions are plausibly deniable, and she does raise
a number of legitimate concerns, but the extent to which they apply to
my work or that of the other contributors to the anthology is unclear.
Meyers takes issue with my claim, which I based on a book-length
argument in its support by Mark Balaguer, that whether or not determinism is true is an open empirical question. She also seems to think
that I think that the answer to that empirical question somehow figures
in determining the exegetical question about whether or not what the
Buddha thought about dependent origination was that it was, or was not,
deterministic. That's a multi-level stacking of assumptions. She states:
Alongside authors who treat the question of whether dependent origination is deterministic as an exegetical question, Repetti cites Balaguer's discussion of the lack of decisive empirical evidence regarding the indeterminism of
neural events relevant to libertarian free will. I don't see
how what science knows or discovers about our neural
events has much to do with what the Buddha meant by
dependent origination. On 202-203, however, Repetti
makes the appropriate distinction between the empirical
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and exegetical, so I assume this was just an oversight. (fn.
13)

This passage places my comments alongside others in my text, as if their
being thus placed implies something she questions but which I did not
say, but later in the same passage Meyers acknowledges that I say the
opposite of what she thinks I imply. But, rather than retract her earlier
view, she retains it, and assumes that it was just an oversight on my part.
In her case, there appear to be a number of oversights. For example,
Meyers acknowledges (much later, in her penultimate footnote, fn. 28)
two other things that call some of her own claims above into question.
The first is that I conclude that both determinism and indeterminism
could turn out to be inconsistent with Buddhism. That observation calls
into question her implicit worry that I might be attributing determinism
to Buddhism. The second is that, on one meditation master's understanding of Buddhist omniscience about the future, the future is open,
insofar as better practice might alter the future. But the idea of an open
future requires indeterminism, something Meyers just rejected (in the
above quote) as irrelevant. Below, she also proposes regulative control,
which entails the ability to bring about an event that is not determined,
which ability requires indeterminism. What puzzles me is why she thinks
the issue of indeterminism is irrelevant to the Buddhist conception of
agency only when I mention it.
Meyers also claims (which claim I will quote shortly below) that it
is understandable that a philosopher cannot be expected to be an exegete. However, I repeatedly emphasize my primary focus on what Buddhists can say. That is a philosophical task, not an exegetical one, despite
cases where the former may be constrained by the latter. I suggest a better exegetical approach to interpreting "Repetti" texts would be one that
takes my seemingly problematic remarks not as oversights unintentionally contradicted by other things I say, but rather as evidence that one
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may have misinterpreted some of my statements by not first taking into
consideration all of my statements and the context they collectively construct. For context determines meaning, and the meanings of philosophical claims are typically developed in stages throughout an article, chapter, or book, if not over the course of a research program, which latter
applies here.
Meyers goes on to critique my ideas as a function of my Western
philosophical training and what she implicitly presumes to be also a
function of my unfamiliarity with exegetical issues in Buddhist studies,
stating: "I am less optimistic about his assertion that Buddhist traditions'
'supernaturalisms' are 'plausibly optional,' and the further implication
that these are irrelevant to the inquiry into a Buddhist theory of free
will" (796). I have made it clear in all of my writings that I am not primarily concerned with excavating what Buddhists have said or thought
about free will or its cognates, but in what Buddhist philosophers can say
about it, particularly in light of Western analytic philosophy. I have also
argued forcefully that the alleged supernatural abilities of the meditation virtuoso would enhance a Buddhist theory of free will, though the
theory can stand independently of them, so I am puzzled by these remarks. Meyers further states:
As a matter of textual interpretation and historical description, it is, of course, deeply problematic to rely on
modern sensibilities about what is natural or plausible to
decide what is essential to Buddhism.
Given that his primary training is in western philosophy, Repetti may not be aware of the extent to which
this dynamic has infected modern interpretations of Buddhism or the degree to which it is has been subjected to
critique in Buddhist studies. (796)
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Whereas trying "to decide what is essential to Buddhism" is a task Meyers seems to take up, the similar (but minor, collateral) task I do take up
(in the course of arguing for a certain view of free will that is informed
by Buddhism) only incidentally involves not what is essential to traditional
Buddhism, but merely to suggest, en passant, what may be considered inessential to contemporary western philosophers interested in Buddhism.
If doing that sort of philosophical work-exploring what contemporary
Buddhists and philosophers (with "modern sensibilities") can say about
free will-automatically makes "this dynamic" (presumably, the dynamic
of my relying on my own modern sensibilities) guilty of exegetical violence ("infect[ing] modern interpretations of Buddhism," and being
oblivious to "the degree to which it has been subjected to critique in
Buddhist studies"), then I am guilty as charged. But the antecedent to
that hypothetical is not satisfied, for I am not engaged in the project of
using a dynamic informed by modern sensibilities to excavate the original meaning and essential doxological elements of early Buddhism.
Meyers also seems to impute intentions to my arguments that I
would deny, but, again, it may be that this one is not directly targeting
my view, when she states: "the problem with letting naturalism inform
interpretation of Buddhist doctrine is not merely descriptive; it also undermines the broader constructive philosophical enterprise" (797). However, I do not let "naturalism inform interpretation of Buddhist doctrine." Rather, naturalism is but one of many paradigms that I consider as
part of a broader set of possible approaches and perspectives, including
supernaturalism, panpsychism, etc., and I do so not to "inform interpretation of Buddhist doctrine," but to bring Buddhist ideas and insights
into dialogue with contemporary philosophy and contemplative neuroscience. Again, Meyers does not explicitly identify me as one who lets
naturalism inform interpretation of Buddhist doctrine, but she presents
such remarks alongside enough similar remarks that do name me to justify the impression that they are aimed at my overall "dynamic."
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Meyers goes on to suggest that Westerners who flirt with Buddhist naturalism may be guilty of colonialism, or what I will dub "Westsplaining," when she says that, "by excluding ideas that we don't find
congenial, we embody a kind of intellectual colonialism that forecloses
opportunities to submit our own philosophical assumptions to scrutiny
and to be genuinely transformed by our encounter with another tradition" (797). Two quick replies are in order.
First, in the Preface to the anthology, I state that I was drawn to
philosophy and Buddhism because, in my first meditation I had an outof-body experience and countless subsequent related precognitive,
transcendent, and related mystical meditation-based experiences that
were inexplicable from the perspective of the physicalist's/naturalist's
paradigm. They permanently altered my life trajectory, leading fairly
directly to this combined work in analytic philosophy applied to the
question of free will in Buddhism. Thus, I was obviously "genuinely
transformed by [my] encounter with another tradition," something
Meyers compliments me for sharing (but then seems to cancel afterwards, to be discussed shortly). Second, throughout my many imaginative chains of philosophical exploration in the anthology, I am anything
but "excluding ideas I don't find congenial" or "foreclosing possibilities."
To the contrary, the bulk of my philosophical work, if not my philosophical modus operandi, is conceiving alternate possibilities and paradigms,
even to ideas I find congenial. Again, I am not named in that objection,
but it is not unreasonable to think it is being presented as applicable to
my views.
As with her previous, initially questionable characterization of
my claims followed by her subsequent imputation of an alleged slip on
my part, Meyers goes on, in the very next paragraph, to mention my outof-body experience, as if it is an "irony" that this happened to me but
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fails to inform my thinking. But it is only her uncharitable interpretation
of my remarks that gives the impression that the irony is on me.
I respect Meyers for (perhaps overzealously) trying to protect the
core subject matter of her own (otherwise excellent) work in excavating
exegetical gems from canonical and/ or authoritative Buddhist texts
without distorting their true meaning. It is a noble intention, surely
what the Buddha would consider Right Intention, to preserve the Dharma
as transmitted. In referring to those of my own mystical experiences
that led me to study the Dharma, Meyers states:
This bit of personal history (which I commend Repetti for
including) suggests to me, at least, that the fact that Buddhism countenances such experiences within a radically
different conception of mind and world than found in our
modern naturalisms-which tend to reject or explain
away such experiences (e.g., Blackmore Seeing)-is not irrelevant to our inquiry. Put another way, the fact that
traditional forms of Buddhism do not share our understanding of the "natural" (and hence "supernatural") is
significant. (798)
I agree. I make clear (Preface) that one of the things that appeals to me in
Buddhism is precisely the fact that it promises to make sense of those
mystical experiences of mine in ways that are not possible within the
standard Western philosophical paradigms.
What I do not understand is why she thinks I advocate Buddhist
naturalism, rather than simply put it on the table as an interesting philosophical project, among others to be considered (by those who wish not
to be "ethnocentric," to quote her quoting (797) of Flanagan), when I
have stated that I cannot explain my most meaningful philosophical experiences within a naturalistic framework. Showing ways in which this
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or that aspect of my analysis may be consistent with naturalism is not
something to be embarrassed about, on the one hand, nor does it entail
an aversion to supernaturalism, on the other hand. To the contrary, it
bears repeating that a key premise in almost anything I've ever written
about Buddhism and free will is that the sort of agency exhibited by
Buddhist meditation virtuosos is so titanic and supernatural that it
makes the libertarian's allegedly strong free will conception-the mere
ability to have done otherwise under identical conditions-appear weak.
This is anything but an aversion to supernaturalism.
In the very next sentence, Meyers directs her criticism to what
may be seen as yet another case ofWest-splaining committed by another
contributor to the edited collection, Owen Flanagan, despite the fact that
Flanagan goes to great length to catalogue variously better and worse
modes of cross-cultural philosophy and apply that matrix of possibilities
to the issue of Buddhism and free will. Meyers states: "In this regard, one
might note the performative contradiction in Flanagan's contention that
naturalized Buddhism offers a serious counterpoint to western concerns
about free will and thus protection against 'philosophical projection and
ethnocentrism"' (Meyers 797, quoting Flanagan Negative 70). Flanagan is
much more careful about his claim than Meyers suggests, however, for
he is referring to the putative fact that Buddhism gets along just fine
without belief in free will-that is his point here, not naturalism.
Meyers herself acknowledges the philosophical fruitfulness of a
project of seeing what can be naturalized in Buddhism, separate from the
question whether it ought to be naturalized, so it is questionable why she
casts Flanagan's naturalization project as a performative contradiction,
simply because he explicitly acknowledges the possible dangers of approaching cross-cultural philosophy in a manner that threatens to distort. But whereas Flanagan is explicitly engaged in the project of natu-
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ralizing Buddhism and advocating for it, I am not engaged in that project, much less advocating it.
In her concluding section, Meyers kindly describes some of my
ideas as raising the level of the discussion, even over her own previous
attempts. But in the same section she suggests that I may be employing
some sort of bait and switch strategy to lure Western philosophers into
engagement with Buddhism by presenting them with an intentionally
disguised appearance of naturalism cloaking a hidden supernaturalism:
Despite the fact that Repetti relies on the idea of naturalizing Buddhism in order to justify inquiry into a Buddhist
theory of free will, his conclusions in chapter seventeen
do not require naturalizing Buddhism, nor does naturalization enter into his discussion there. Indeed, one might
even get the impression that all the talk of naturalization
may have just been a ploy to lure philosophers afraid of
"hocus pocus" (Flanagan Bodhisattva's) into a conversation
with Buddhism, and not a true conviction in the idea that
Buddhism can or should be naturalized. (812)
Three responses are in order, following an emerging pattern. First, this
passage ignores the fact that I rely primarily and explicitly on the Buddha's own rejection of a number of forms of inevitabilism that constitute
the bulk of the forms of free will skepticism, and I only mention the potential for naturalism as one among many other minor possible justifications, and not as one that I personally advocate. Thus, it is not a "fact
that Repetti relies on the idea of naturalizing Buddhism in order to justify inquiry into a Buddhist theory of free will," as I do not rely on that
strategy.
Second, this passage seems to run afoul of the principle of charitable interpretation. Instead, third, Meyers could easily have, and should
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have, taken the fact that my "conclusions in chapter seventeen do not
require naturalizing Buddhism" and the fact that naturalization does not
even "enter into his discussion there" and relied on those two remarks
in order to avoid misinterpreting me as someone advocating naturalism
in the first place. I do not engage in a bait and switch ploy, though Meyers explicitly advocates such a ploy.
A good part, if not the better bulk, of Meyers's analysis is not di-

rectly critical of my work or of the entire collection, but rather is taken
up by her own positive analysis of the history of the shifting conceptual
content to the notion of dependent origination throughout the different
(mostly early) periods of Buddhism. I have no objection directly targeted
to this fine feature of her work; in fact, I think a lacuna in Buddhist philosophical scholarship that needs to be addressed concerns the Buddhist
understanding(s) of the nature of causation and which, if any, contemporary understandings may be coextensive, overlapping, or different.
However, this aspect of her work is nonetheless indirectly critical of my
analysis and that of most of the other contributors to the edited collection insofar as it constitutes the basis for her criticism of comparing the
Western scientific conception of determinism with dependent origination, the latter of which she shows has more differences than commonalities with the former than recent commentators emphasize. Fair enough,
in one sense, but perhaps not so, in another.
There is certainly a difference between any of the conceptions of
dependent origination Meyers identifies and determinism; for example,
dependent origination in its earliest rendering seems narrowly restricted to the chain of psychophysical links connected with soteriological
progress, the narrow scope of which certainly differs from that of universal causation. However, any narrowly-scoped causal sequence will
always differ in scope from universal causation, but, by analogy, the
causal rules that determine transitions between H20's solid, liquid, and
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gaseous states are narrow in scope, but these are merely particular instances of this or that specific type of causal relationship: all such specific causal relationships, such as laws of genetic inheritance or electron
bonding, however, fall under the broader category of universal causation, and are subject to it, whether we focus on this aspect of causality or
not.
The arguably ostrich psychology strategy of not noticing universal causation does not exempt particular causation from universal causation, nor would a specific karmic cause/ effect pair be exempt from the
global interconnectedness of all conditioned phenomena (interdependence). Thus, this scope difference alone does not automatically guarantee a valid element of disanalogy. Likewise, nor do the other elements of
disanalogy she identifies, such as Gowans's emphasis (in the anthology)
on the organic (agrarian) examples of later, more broadly conceived interpretations of dependent origination that are somewhat broader in
scope, though not explicitly universal. That is arguably more ostrich
psychology, but not looking at the causal structure of the world doesn't
make it go away.
This should go without saying, but many otherwise insightful analysts frequently miss this basic element of analogical critique. (Meyers's
paper is subtitled "Dependent Origination and the Perils of Analogy in
Cross-Cultural Philosophy," so I would expect her analysis of the main
analogy in question to be one that avoids the perils of analogical reasoning.) Thus, all analogies between any two things A and B, by definition,
must have some disanalogous elements, otherwise they are not two different things (in the latter case, A and Bare just two instances of the exact same thing, or A=A, where A appears under a different description as
B). Therefore, merely noting some disanalogous elements between any
two non-identical entities A and B cannot automatically invalidate the
A/B analogy in question. Rather, the differences between A and B re-
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quired to undermine the analogy between A and B must be relevant differences, where the relevantly disanalogous elements must be those that
directly undermine the intention or point of the analogy. It is not clear
that Meyers's otherwise astute analysis of the differences between the
various conceptions of dependent origination reveals those differences
to be sufficiently relevant to the points of the analogies to invalidate
them.
Of course, philosophical analysis should be sensitive to differences in conceptions between dependent origination and determinism, if
any, when comparing them. But it does not follow from the fact that
they are different in various ways that they cannot be intelligently compared at all, nor that they should not be compared, unless they are so
different that they cannot be intelligently compared at all, in which case
they would have no analogous elements. Nothing in Meyers's analysis
suggests that they are so different that it would be unintelligible or a
category error to even try to compare them. By analogy, the mere fact
that neurological phenomena (such as Meyers suggested were completely off base in my reference to them) and biological phenomena (such as
Gowans's agrarian, organic model) are different from chemical or atomic
phenomena in no way invalidates the idea that they may all be analyzed
from a deterministic perspective, or an interdependence perspective,
contrary to the opposite ostrich psychology impression. Meyers's paper,
again, is entitled "False Friends: Dependent Origination and the Perils of
Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," but the greater perils of analogy
in her own cross-cultural philosophy may not be so much the ones she
points to as the ones directing her to point.
Besides, some quite respectable, brilliant Buddhist scholars take
the view that Buddhist causation is deterministic; some of them (e.g.,
Goodman) were printed in the anthology, alongside my article and hers. It
may or may not be the case that Buddhist causation is rightly considered
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deterministic, but that is not a central concern of mine. The gist of my
main argument (Agentless) is precisely that it doesn't matter what the
nature of causation is from the perspective of the Buddhist meditation
virtuoso. For the virtuoso enjoys not only freedom of the will, but mental
freedom. That mental freedom is attainable regardless of not only the
nature of causation (deterministic, indeterministic, neither, or both), but
even if manipulated by nefarious neuroscientists, if embodied as a brain
in a vat, or if downloaded into a digital mind. Surely this main claim-of
the great power of Buddhist mental freedom-bears on Meyers's concerns, revealing them to be unfounded or misplaced.
In her concluding section, Meyers mentions my mystical experiences as the sort of thing Buddhism could explain (if only I was receptive), and implicitly depicts me as being unaware of what Buddhists have
to say about those experiences, and as likely being insensitive to reasons,
stating: "Learning what Buddhists have to say about these things probably won't affect Repetti's soft compatibilist account" (813). She proposes
what is presented as if it is a stronger alternative to my account, that includes genuine regulative control, which requires indeterminism, as opposed to the sort of pseudo-regulative control that is possible in a deterministic world. (Genuine regulative control is my description, taken
from Fischer, for the libertarian's ability to do otherwise.) Engaging with
such contemporary Western ideas and the philosophical dynamic they
are embedded in, it should be pointed out, is something that concerns
Meyers, but only when I do so.
Yet again, Meyers ignores that I emphasize-and have been emphasizing for about a decade now-that the sort of titanic mind-control
and psychic abilities depicted by Buddhist meditation virtuosos clearly
surpass the libertarian's otherwise mundane ability to have done otherwise, e.g., the libertarian claims that while she chose the tofu, she could
have chosen the seitan, all other things being identical. Meyers appar-
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ently fails to grasp my simple definition of soft compatibilism: contrary
to hard incompatibilism, which holds that free will is incompatible with
determinism and with indeterminism, soft compatibilism holds that free
will is compatible with determinism, with indeterminism, with both,
and/ or with neither. Buddhist soft compatibilism simply holds that Buddhism is compatible with soft compatibilism. Again, the sort of control
that I argue is exhibited by Buddhist meditation virtuosos makes Meyers's allegedly "stronger" regulative control-the libertarian's mere ability to have done otherwise-appear facile, but I do not even reject that
form of regulative control. I simply note that it is arguably optional.
Again, Meyers ignores what I have said about the role of my own
physicalism-challenging meditation experiences, what I have said about
the powers of meditation virtuosos, and what I have said about what
Buddhism can say about them, directly stating or indirectly implying or
suggesting that I'm unaware of this, that I haven't taken it seriously, or
that I have ruled out things that I have not ruled out, stating:
But perhaps the real payoff for taking what Buddhists say
on these matters seriously, for not automatically bracketing or ruling out the bits of Buddhism that smack of supernaturalism, is that it may turn out that our current
naturalisms are insufficient to explain these and other
human experiences. In other words, Buddhism may track
features of our world (or worlds) that are worth knowing
about but regularly excluded from our current naturalisms. (813)
Apart from the fact that implicit assumptions driving this quote seem
clearly to refer to her corrective for me, I couldn't agree with this quote
more. It simply does not apply to me.
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In her concluding sentence, Meyers states: "Rather than relying
on Gould's NOMA thesis to guide our cross-cultural philosophical inquiries, perhaps we should aim for a more expansive, borderless, and eminently revisable magisterium" (814). Considering her implicit and sometimes explicit defense of a somewhat restrictive conception of Buddhism, which has normative implications regarding which (original)
Buddhist beliefs are canonical and which (contemporary, western, scientific, or naturalistic) beliefs threaten to transmogrify Buddhism, her aspirational use of the phrase "more expansive, borderless, and eminently
revisable" seems inconsistently applied. Whoever it is that Meyers
thinks is "relying on Gould's NOMA thesis to guide our cross-cultural
philosophical inquiries," or doing most of the things she seems to think I
am doing in the anthology, my reply is the same: It wasn't me.
I began by noting that either I have failed to express my own
views clearly, Meyers has misunderstood them, or some combination of
both. I have reviewed several of the claims Meyers seems to attribute to
me, alongside several very related claims that were not explicitly directed at me, but which may reasonably be taken to be implicitly part of
her general critique of my approach, and tried to show how they somehow miss the mark if they are indeed directed at my work. It is admittedly unclear whether some of her remarks that I have replied to were even
directed to my work, but I thought it might be helpful to respond to
them as if they were, just to clear up any possible misconceptions. I hope
I have succeeded in clarifying anything that may have been unclear.
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